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Abstract:
Motivating reforms to address discrimination and exclusion is important. 
But what epistemic practices characterise better or worse ways of doing 
this? Recently, the phenomena of implicit biases have played a large role 
in motivating reforms. We argue that this strategy risks perpetuating two 
kinds of epistemic oppression: the vindication dynamic and contributory 
injustice. We offer positive proposals for avoiding these forms of 
epistemic oppression when confronting racism. 
 
Cambridge University Press





Implicit Bias and Epistemic Oppression in Confronting Racism1
1. Introduction  
In taxonomizing the different forms that racism can take, Gloria Yamato identifies the 
category of unaware/unintentional racism, and its role in systemic and 
institutionalised forms of racism: ‘with the best of intentions, the best of educations, 
and the greatest generosity of heart, whites, operating on the misinformation fed to 
them from day one, will behave in ways that are racist, will perpetuate racism by 
being “nice” the way we're taught to be nice’ (2004: 100).2 Many recent reform 
efforts argued for within academia (and beyond) have focused on this kind of racism. 
Whilst acknowledging that attention to specific acts of discrimination is only part of 
tackling racism, which is systemic and structural, some have pushed for policies and 
procedures to be changed in order to combat unintentional racism.3 Relying on good 
will and anti-racist intentions cannot be sufficient.
It is important, however, that changes to policies and procedures are driven by 
the right kinds of evidence. This raises the question of what type of evidence should 
be used to motivate reforms to tackle unintentional racism. Recent discussions of 
unintentional racism have given prominence to one type of evidence: studies from 
social psychology on implicit bias (see e.g. Saul  2013, 2018, the American 
Philosophical Association Good Practices Guide, e.g. Section 2, p.15, Section 5 p.62). 
This research has motivated reforms in some institutions (albeit with varying degrees 
of commitment to rooting out deeply entrenched racism, since the institutions 
promising reforms based on concerns about implicit bias range from individual 
Philosophy Departments, to whole Universities, to Google, healthcare providers, and 
police forces). However, we argue there are risks associated with focusing too 
1 We thank audiences at the Bias in Context Workshop at California State Polytechnic University, 
Pomona; The University of Sheffield; The University of Edinburgh; and The University of 
Southampton for feedback on earlier versions of this paper, as well as comments from anonymous 
reviewers that have enabled the paper to evolve significantly since its first submission. 
2 The other categories Yamato introduces and analyses are: aware/blatant racism, aware/covert racism, 
and unaware/self-righteous racism.
3 Moreover, attention to structural racism also requires attention to individual actions (since individual 
action partially constitutes social structures, and since individual action is needed to implement 
changes to institutional practices). See e.g. Haslanger 2015, Madva 2016, cf. Ayala and Vasilyeva 2015 
and Ayala 2016
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narrowly on this type of evidence at the expense of another source of evidence about 
unintentional racism: testimony from lived experience of racism. 
We draw on insights from black feminist epistemology to argue that to neglect 
of this testimonial evidence risks perpetrating two types of injustice: (i) the 
vindication dynamic, in which testimony of lived experience of discrimination is 
treated as in need of vindication, (ii) contributory injustice, which occurs when 
members of marginalised groups are denied the opportunity to contribute to the 
shared interpretative resources available within a community. Efforts to motivate anti-
racist reforms, therefore, should draw on and integrate both sources of evidence, as 
we later propose.
2. Sources of evidence
This section introduces two sources of evidence about unintentional racism, each of 
which provides support for instigating changes to policies and procedures (there are 
of course various other evidentiary sources: statistical, historical, etc. We set these 
aside for now).
a. Testimonial resources, literary and social psychological 
One source of evidence is testimony from those with lived experience of unintentional 
racism. One recent source of testimonial evidence is Claudia Rankine’s (2014) 
Citizen, An American Lyric, which provides a rich and bleak compendium of the 
everyday slights and insults experienced by Black Americans. Rankine presents 
testimonies, based on her own and others experiences, articulated in the second-
personal ‘you’ form, in order to position the reader as ‘an apparent part of the 
encounter.’ (Rankine also explains two other reasons for this form of address: first, 
that since the experiences were not all her own, she did not want to ‘own’ them with 
the first personal pronoun, and second, that addressing the reader as ‘you’ forces them 
to make assumptions about race: ‘you’re race-ing these people in order to understand 
this dynamic. I wanted that positioning to happen for readers’ (Rankine, in Sharma 
2014).) For example: 
You and your partner go to see the film The House We Live In. You ask a 
friend to pick up your child from school. On your way home your phone rings. 
Your neighbour tells you he is standing at his window watching a menacing 
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black guy casing both your homes. The guy is walking back and forth talking 
to himself and seems disturbed…. Your partner calls your friend and asks him 
if there’s a guy walking back and forth in front of your home. Your friend says 
that if anyone were outside he would see him because he is standing outside. 
You hear sirens through the speakerphone. (2014: 15)
In line at the drugstore it’s finally your turn, and then it’s not as he walks in 
front of you and puts his things on the counter. The cashier says, Sir, she was 
next. When he turns to you he is truly surprised. 
Oh my God, I didn’t see you.
You must be in a hurry, you offer.
No, no, no, I really didn’t see you. (2014: 77)
When the waitress hands your friend the card she took from you, you laugh 
and ask what else her privilege gets her? (2014: 148)
In these passages Rankine explores the way neighbours, strangers and friends are 
implicated in – perpetrators of, or party to – a daily grind of racist slights: assuming as 
other, as dangerous, intrusive, out of place. 
The following features of Rankine’s examples are especially important to the current 
analysis. First, these insults are presented as slips, or unintentional, or unthinking. 
This is not to say they are driven by implicit bias, but rather that perpetrators of them 
may not be driven by ill will (though this is not precluded). They would fit Yamato’s 
category of ‘unintentional racism’. Second, prominent alongside these descriptions is 
the grappling with ambivalence – ‘what did he just say? Did she really just say that? 
Did I hear what I think I heard? Did that just come out of my mouth, his mouth, your 
mouth?’ (2014: 9). Third, the deniability of what happened hinders the ability to 
definitively label any one instance racism – couldn’t the incident be rationalised some 
other way (an honest mistake)? Compare also the title of Yamato’s piece: ‘Something 
about the subject makes it hard to name’. Fourth, dealing with the ambivalence that 
results, in part from the deniability, is part of the burden that Rankine describes. But, 
fifth, the cumulative effect reveals – to the protagonist and to the reader – a pattern of 
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treatment underwritten by a set of associations that others apply to her and that she 
carries with her: Black, dangerous, intrusive, other, trespassing in white space.
Testimonies can also be found in the literature on experiences of 
microaggressions. In a series of focus groups, Sue and colleagues (2008) gathered 
testimonies of people of colours’ experiences of microaggressions, and identified 
commonalities in participants’ experiences. One of the prominent themes – that 
resonates with Rankine’s writings– is the deniability of the behaviour, and the 
possibility of rationalising it away as something other than racism, despite how it was 
experienced. Sue et al write of ‘Another participant[’s] ... struggle when a White 
woman changed seats on the train from sitting next to her:
Maybe it just so happened that the person she decided to sit next to wasn’t 
Black, and she wasn’t Black. I can’t say that’s why she moved, but maybe she 
wanted to be close to the window. I don’t know.’ (2008: 332) 
Notwithstanding the ambiguity, the understanding of how one might be perceived – 
dangerous, out of place, incompetent –  is reported as ever present and shaping 
interactions: 
inside an elevator, a closed space, being very conscious if there is a White 
woman, whether or not she’s afraid, or just sort of noticing me, trying to relax 
myself around her so she’s not afraid. (2008: 333)
So when I walk into a hospital and say I’m here to fix your machine, I get a 
double take initially … They ask me a lot of questions … It’s subtle, it’s more 
like they want to find out what I know and who I am before they trust me with 
it (2008: 333)
Others reported strategies for dealing with this, notably, identifying what has gone 
wrong with the interaction in terms of unintentional or unconscious white racism:
I don’t blame it on myself; it’s not like, what’s wrong with me? It’s like, oh, 
that’s that White unconsciousness that they’re so well trained in (2008: 332)
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However, the participants emphasised the pervasiveness of the slights, and the burden 
of interpreting or challenging every one of them:
If you were to address every microaggression, it’s like all ‘Oh there you go 
again, you people’ (2008: 333)
At issue here again is a failure to be able to effectively communicate due to the 
incompetence of one’s audience (what Dotson has called ‘testimonial smothering’ 
(2011: 244)). What one wants to express is that harmful discrimination has occurred, 
but this is not recognised as such by the perpetrators who would be confronted – 
instead ‘there you go again’.
These examples show how testimony from lived experience can provide 
evidence about unintentional racism. Note also that again, there is emphasis on the 
deniability of the discriminatory treatment; there is attention to the difficulty of 
identifying it as an instance of discrimination; and the difficulty of confronting the 
perpetrator who (it is anticipated) shares a different way of understanding the 
incident. As we can see, testimonial evidence - from literature, qualitative research in 
social psychology, or elsewhere - has the potential to be a powerful tool wherever 
evidence of unintentional racism can be used to motivate and shape institutional 
change. 
b. Evidence from the social psychology research programme on implicit bias
The second source of evidence about some instances of unintentional racism is 
psychological research on implicit bias. Many philosophers – and indeed, many 
people outside the academy – are by now familiar with the notion of implicit bias. 
Implicit biases are the mental constructs that lead people to automatically associate 
members of social groups with certain characteristics (though there are competing 
ways of understanding what these mental constructs are, see e.g. Holroyd et al 2017). 
These automatic thought processes may encode stereotypes or negative evaluations 
contrary to the thinker’s professed values. For example, studies show that people who 
report egalitarian principles can harbour implicit biases that encode racist stereotypes 
and evaluations. Implicit biases are hypothesized to be at work in studies that reveal 
discriminatory behaviours. Implicit biases are recognized to be pervasive, but difficult 
to detect and to control (see Jost et al 2009 for an overview).  
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Psychological studies purport to measure such biases using indirect measures. 
These are experimental techniques that bypass participants’ reflective self-reports of 
their beliefs or attitudes. For example, the Implicit Association Test (IAT) measures 
how quickly and accurately participants respond to stimuli representing a social group 
(e.g. white or Black) and stimuli representing concepts such as loyal, honest or abuse, 
murder (on an evaluative IAT), or brainy, smart vs athletic, rhythmic on a stereotype 
IAT (Amodio & Devine 2006). The speed and accuracy of participants’ responses are 
used to generate a score that reflects the difference in response times with respect to 
each social group (e.g. how much faster at categorizing white with positive notions or 
stereotypes, than Black with positive notions or stereotypes). It is inferred that this 
indicates how strongly participants associate the respective social groups with the 
target concepts (the evaluations, positive or negative, or stereotypes). Typically, these 
studies indicate that participants hold biases against Black people. 
Studies also look for the impact of implicit bias on discriminatory behaviours. 
For example, studies that focused on employment contexts found that participants 
made differential evaluations of the same CV and differential hiring recommendations 
based on interview materials depending on the race of the candidate (Dovidio & 
Gaertner, 2000). In medical contexts, practitioners who participated in studies made 
differential treatment prescriptions to white or Black patients based on the same 
presentation of symptoms – and their tendency to do so correlated with the extent to 
which they showed implicit racial bias on indirect measures (the Implicit Association 
Test) (Green et al 2007). In studies that looked at behaviors that may manifest in 
everyday interactions, white participants were found to sit further away from Black 
individuals, smile less, converse less and manifest more errors of speech (McConnell 
& Leibold 2001).  If such behaviors issue from implicit bias, then they may be 
instances of unintentional racism, perpetrated without ill-will or explicit prejudice. 
Researchers on implicit bias are at pains to emphasise the pervasiveness of the 
phenomena – the majority of white participants, and perhaps half of Black 
participants show patterns of anti-Black bias. And it is hypothesized that the 
occasions on which bias might be most likely to influence behavior are those in which 
one’s behavior can be rationalized by some other, non-race-related considerations 
(Dovidio & Gaertner 2000).
Drawing on such findings has been a catalyst for change, for example: 
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a) Enabling individuals (who may be in a position to enact institutional 
change) to gain a greater awareness of the possibility that they are 
complicit (albeit unintentionally, and despite good-will) in discrimination;
b) Opening up conversations about discrimination and inclusion – which may 
prove easier if they do not involve attributions of ill-will or explicit 
prejudice (though see Eddo-Lodge (2018: xii) on the problems with 
tailoring discussions of race to accommodate white people’s discomfort);
c) Motivating institutional reforms that combat unintentional racism, such as: 
reform of reading lists, hiring procedures; workplace climate policies and 
so on (see e.g. Saul 2018, Holroyd & Saul 2018 for an overview of these 
reforms within academia).
Recent impetus to make institutional changes to combat unintentional racism has been 
generated in large part due to discussions drawing on the implicit bias research 
programme. But, despite these gains, there are problems with drawing on this 
evidence alone—it is these that we aim to highlight.
3. Selecting evidence, the vindication dynamic, and contributory injustice
Since there are multiple sources of evidence to which one might appeal in one’s 
attempts to instigate positive institutional change, what hangs on the choice about to 
which evidence to appeal? In this section, we argue that there are risks associated with 
the use of one kind of evidence – that from quantitative research on implicit bias—
while not properly incorporating other evidence, i.e. the testimony from lived 
experience of racism.
This is motivated first by the thought that due to the pervasiveness of 
discussions of the psychological research on implicit bias, many people are likely to 
find this evidence to be especially compelling and powerful, and consequently focus 
on it to the detriment of other evidence. And, second, as we will spell out, there are 
particular costs and harms associated with focusing solely on the quantitative 
psychological findings that would not be incurred by focusing solely on testimonial 
evidence. Specifically, there is a risk of perpetrating what, drawing on Patricia Hill 
Collins’ work, we call a vindication dynamic, and a kind of injustice that Kristie 
Dotson has identified as contributory injustice. Note that our claim is not that there is 
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something intrinsic to the findings of quantitative social psychology that generates 
these risks. Rather, in our current social and academic climate, which is one in which 
scholars of colour are marginalized or excluded, and in which testimony of people of 
colour is often silenced or unheard, these risks loom large.
a. The vindication dynamic
Our concern in this section is an epistemic dynamic that is described by Patricia Hill 
Collins in Black Feminist Thought. Collins provides the following example:
various descendants of Sally Hemings, a Black woman owned by Thomas 
Jefferson, claimed repeatedly that Jefferson fathered her children. These 
accounts forwarded by Jefferson’s African-American descendants were 
ignored in favour of accounts advanced by his White progeny. Heming’s 
descendants were routinely disbelieved until their knowledge claims were 
validated by DNA testing. (2002: 270)
Testimony provided by Hemings and her descendants was denied credibility until 
scientific tests supported the claims found therein. Faced with conflicting testimonial 
evidence, racist norms of credibility ensured that testimony from white speakers was 
afforded credibility that Hemings and her descendants were not. Yet Hemings’ 
testimony was ultimately vindicated by DNA evidence (Gordon-Reed & Takagi 
1997). Whilst this vindication is important, there is something problematic in the idea 
that certain kinds of testimony - testimony from people of colour, especially when it 
challenges existing power structures and hierarchies - stand in need of vindication. 
The assumption that Hemings’ testimony alone cannot provide sufficient reason for 
belief, absent verification from other sources of evidence, is part of a long history of 
epistemic exclusion. 
The vindication dynamic may be thought of as an instance of what Kristie 
Dotson and Marita Gilbert have recently labelled ‘disappearances’: as they put it, ‘the 
lives and experiences of Black women are rendered invisible in public narratives’ 
(Dotson & Gilbert, 2014: 873, pointing to the work of Fannie Barrier Williams 
(1905), Zora Neale Hurston (1950), Audre Lorde (1990), Rebecca Wanzo (2009)). 
For example, Zora Neale Hurston (1950) described the one-dimensional stereotypes 
that obscure the intellectual and emotional lives of Black Americans. Rebecca Wanzo 
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(2009), writing more than half a century later, argues that whilst narratives are present 
in public discourse, they often homogenise experiences and focus on personal - rather 
than social - transformation as a way of overcoming oppression, thus obscuring the 
reality and experience of systemic racism. Our focus in this section is on one 
epistemic dynamic that can render narrative and testimonial evidence of racism 
invisible, ensuring that it is often not present in contemporary discourses about 
discrimination (cf. Davidson, 2019, who raises similar concerns about the use of 
implicit bias evidence within academic philosophy. Davidson focuses on how the use 
of the empirical evidence prevents widespread ('third-order') change to epistemic 
systems).
Collins takes the treatment of Hemings’ to illustrate the ways in which ‘power 
relations shape who is believed and why’ (2002: 270). In this case, power dynamics 
of race and gender lead the testimony of a Black woman to be treated as unreliable. 
The contributions made by her testimony are therefore marginalized and undermined 
as a source of knowledge and, moreover, the subsequent exclusion of such knowledge 
conveniently serves to sustain certain myths about race and racial purity (e.g. that 
whites were superior, that whites and Blacks should not and did not miscegenate and 
that slave owners’ sexual abuse of enslaved women was not one of the ways in which 
they were exploited), the conduct of whites in power (as morally impeccable, rather 
than as exploitative, morally corrupt and as perpetrators of abuses with impunity), the 
place of Black people in America (as passively, indeed naturally, subservient). Collins 
explores the ways that such epistemic dynamics marginalize important understanding 
of experiences of oppression, and Black women are further harmed by their exclusion 
from the epistemic community and the inability to get on the record the nature of their 
social experiences. 
This is just one form of what Dotson calls epistemic oppression: ‘the 
epistemic exclusions afforded positions and communities that produce deficiencies in 
social knowledge’, whereby an exclusion concerns infringements that reduce 
knowers’ ability to participate in epistemic communities (2012: 24). Our suggestion 
here is that such a dynamic is risked in discussions of unintentional racism focusing 
solely on quantitative psychological research on implicit bias. To understand this 
point, let us probe the example of Hemings further. In this case there are multiple 
epistemic wrongs. In the first instance, there is the wrong of the initial epistemic 
exclusion of Hemings (and indeed, slave women in general). To the extent that 
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Hemings’ testimony is later vindicated by the emergence of DNA evidence, it is 
important to note that it is the proposition at issue that is vindicated. Her testimony is 
regarded as something that stood in need of post hoc vindication. Her status as a 
knower and her testimony alone was and remains insufficient to provide the evidential 
support for the proposition that Jefferson fathered her children (despite her being, one 
might think, uniquely placed to determine this, and despite the consistency of her 
account with what is widely known about the sexual exploitation of enslaved women 
by white owners). 
Note that whilst the later means of vindication might itself be epistemically 
respectable – endorsing the findings of well conducted DNA studies is a rational 
response to the evidence – it nonetheless contributes to an oppressive epistemic 
dynamic. Even though the moment of vindication is not itself one in which we see an 
exclusion, it puts in stark relief the epistemic norms that cast some knowers as 
unreliable sources of knowledge. The vindication dynamic contrasts with cases in 
which some initial evidence, taken to have probative value, is later given further 
support by being confirmed or corroborated. The initial testimony is not considered to 
have probative value, which is precisely why the later evidence is vindicatory. To the 
extent that this vindication dynamic entrenches norms that shape who is and is not 
reliable, or which testimony does or does not stand in need of vindication, it 
contributes to patterns of epistemic oppression.
What is the relevance of this dynamic to our practical question of to what 
evidence we might appeal in supporting the proposition that discrimination can be 
unintentional? Focusing solely on quantitative evidence from the research programme 
on implicit bias sidelines pre-existing testimonial evidence about racism, 
foregrounding evidence emerging from academic studies, generated in laboratory 
conditions. It also marginalises the work of people of colour who have articulated 
these aspects of their experience, thereby marginalising evidence based in lived 
experience. This has particularly consequential racial dynamics, insofar as, as Collins 
(2002) writes, such evidence has particular importance in Black women’s epistemic 
communities. Conversely, evidence emanating from the predominantly white 
academy is privileged. Collins’ diagnosis focuses in particular on hierarchies of 
knowledge (academic research vs testimonial), which are themselves racialized. This 
explanatory framework is more plausible than an explanation that appeals just to the 
race of those producing the research, since in this case much prominent research on 
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implicit bias is conducted by scholars of colour (e.g. Jennifer Eberhardt, M. Banaji, C. 
Lai). Testimonial evidence is not valued in this hierarchy, but in particular the 
testimony of women of colour is devalued, Collins argues.
So, whilst there is something very important about providing evidence for the 
proposition at issue – that racism can be unintentionally perpetrated– there are risks 
involved with doing so by appeal only to the quantitative research program on 
implicit bias. Whilst the proposition for which there is testimonial evidence—that 
there exists unintentional racism—is confirmed by appeal to evidence of implicit bias, 
the emphasis on that evidence risks entrenching certain oppressive epistemic 
dynamics. In particular, it risks entrenching the message that certain testimony – 
qualitative testimonial evidence based in experience, specifically the experiences of 
people of colour – is insufficiently credible and stands in need of vindication. It risks 
entrenching the notion that this, rather than that evidence suffices to warrant belief. 
(One might think that evidence from research on implicit bias is helpful in that it 
increases the credibility of future testifiers about racism. This does not mitigate the 
problem for past and present and future testifiers, whose words apparently need 
vindication.)
Focusing only on the psychological research on implicit bias also risks 
conveying the message that the kind of evidence that is important is that which 
affirms the existence of (the possibility of) unintentional racism by focusing on the 
cognitions of the perpetrators. The ‘mere’ experience of those targeted by the 
discrimination, according to these norms, is insufficient to warrant belief. To 
prioritise psychological research on implicit bias is to suggest not only that testimony 
alone is insufficient, but that a certain kind of evidence is needed to vindicate these 
‘perceptions’ – evidence concerning the cognitions of perpetrators.
In drawing attention to the vindication dynamic, we do not need to establish 
that (as is plausibly the case with Hemings) the disregarding of testimonial evidence 
is in each instance a case of testimonial injustice in the sense that has become familiar 
through the work of Miranda Fricker ((2007) namely, involving prejudicial 
judgements of deflated credibility due to one’s social identity).  We do not need to 
maintain that all, or even the majority, of cases in which people appeal solely to 
quantitative psychological findings on implicit bias when discussing unintentional 
racism are cases in which those people are displaying prejudice or making 
judgements of reduced credibility. Nor do we want to maintain this, since we lack the 
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data about the cognitive states of those who have appealed to implicit bias evidence. 
What is important to the current discussion, however, is that focusing solely on 
psychological research on implicit bias serves to entrench certain hierarchical norms, 
and perpetuate epistemic exclusions that produce deficiencies in social knowledge 
(Dotson, 2012: 24). Failing to heed someone’s testimonial evidence is to proceed as if 
it lacks credibility, even if such judgements have not been made. The dynamic that we 
describe thus instantiates a form of epistemic oppression.
In selecting one’s evidence, then, we must be alert to the risk that attention 
only to psychological research on implicit bias risks entrenching a set of epistemic 
norms whereby the status of testimony of lived experience of racism is relegated. 
Moreover, focusing solely on the psychological research on implicit bias risks 
entrenching oppressive norms about the kind of evidence that is reliable: the lived 
experience of people of colour is devalued, and stands in need of vindication from 
more ‘respectable’ sources of evidence.4  
b. Contributory injustice
We now consider a second risk faced by focusing on the research programme on 
implicit bias rather than testimonial evidence: the risk of perpetrating a specific form 
of injustice identified by Kristie Dotson, i.e. contributory injustice. 
Contributory injustice is defined as the circumstance where: 
an epistemic agent’s willful hermeneutical ignorance in maintaining and 
utilizing structurally prejudiced hermeneutical resources thwarts a knower’s 
ability to contribute to shared epistemic resources within a given epistemic 
community by compromising her epistemic agency (Dotson, 2012: 32).
4 By focusing on how epistemic norms and practices produce epistemic wrongs our work here is 
consistent with recent arguments presented by Charles Mills (2007), Kristie Dotson (2012), Jose 
Medina (2013), Saray Ayala and Nadya Vasilyeva (2015; Ayala 2016), and Michael Doan (2018). 
Ayala and Vasilyeva (2015), for example, argue that testimonial injustice is rooted in linguistic 
conventions. Meanwhile, Doan (2018) emphasises how accounts of epistemic injustice can better 
capture political struggles for recognition and self-determination if they focus on the epistemic norms 
underpinning communities and institutions. 
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Hermeneutical resources are our resources for making sense of the world – concepts, 
theoretical frameworks, narratives, practical starting points or assumptions and so 
forth. They are structurally prejudiced if the ability of people in different social 
locations to contribute to the shared hermeneutical resources is asymmetrical. For 
example, if white people are able to participate in the shaping of the resources 
available to make sense of the social world to a greater extent than Black people, 
those resources are structurally prejudiced. Such a pattern of participation will 
produce hermeneutical resources that are unduly influenced by those hermeneutically 
advantaged people who have contributed – usually, those in positions of power and 
influence – and insufficiently influenced by members of the marginalised groups 
themselves. This asymmetrical influence is likely to result in a set of resources that is 
a better ‘fit’ for the experiences of those in a hermeneutically advantaged position, 
and a worse ‘fit’ for the experiences of those in hermeneutically disadvantaged 
positions, in that it lacks the conceptual resources or interpretative meanings that are 
needed to well capture the experi nces of the latter group(s). Marginalised groups 
may have developed their own hermeneutical resources: ‘alternative epistemologies, 
countermythologies, and hidden transcripts’ (Dotson 2012: 31). These alternative sets 
of hermeneutical resources are available for marginalized individuals to understand 
their social experiences, but are not part of shared collective resources. 
Contributory injustice occurs, then, when the resources that marginalised 
people use to interpret and articulate their experiences are not acknowledged or taken 
seriously in an epistemic community, and when the dominant hermeneutical resources 
used in that community thwart those individuals’ ability to contribute to the shared 
resources (the alternative resources they do have available are not widely understood 
or regarded as useful conceptualisations). An example of contributory injustice is 
provided by Reni Eddo Lodge, who describes how the concept of ‘intersectionality’ -  
developed by Black feminist scholars to articulate how gender and racial oppressions 
intersect to disadvantage Black women - has been refused uptake by writers in the 
mainstream media in the UK, ostensibly for being ‘utter jargon’ (2015: 140).
On Dotson’s account of contributory injustice, these structurally prejudiced 
hermeneutical resources are utilised by an agent or agents due to their willful 
ignorance. Willful ignorance, for Dotson, ‘maps onto [an] epistemically culpable 
failure’ (2012: 33), so at stake here are cases of ignorance where one should have 
known better. On Dotson’s account, it is easy to fall short of the relevant epistemic 
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standards. Her claim is that contributory injustice is very easy to commit, and very 
difficult to avoid (2012: 38-40). Dotson argues that people can perpetrate contributory 
injustice without being aware of doing so, without thinking that they are putting a foot 
wrong (accordingly, the degree to which the failure is epistemically culpable could 
vary considerably. Since, contributory injustice is difficult to avoid, one might think 
that the degree of culpability may, in some instances, be minimal).
With this exposition of contributory injustice in place, we now consider how 
one’s selection of evidence – in particular, a selection that focuses solely on research 
on implicit bias – could perpetrate contributory injustice. Earlier, we presented what 
can be thought of as two sets of hermeneutical resources that can be used to frame 
one’s understanding of unintentional racism and exclusion. One set of hermeneutical 
resources is grounded in the lived experiences of individuals who have experienced 
and witnessed discrimination. The other set of hermeneutical resources has been 
developed within social psychology, and is concerned with the notion of implicit bias 
and its role in unintentional racism. (Of course, these two sets of resources need not 
be exclusive - they may be partially overlapping, as we saw above, when some 
participants refer to the notion of unconscious bias to explain their experiences.)
Here, we want to argue that in selecting one’s evidence, and choosing to focus 
solely on the resources from the quantitative research programme on implicit bias, 
one may perpetrate contributory injustice. To show this, we need to show that such 
resources are structurally prejudicial, that use of them thwarts other knowers from 
contributing to the epistemic community, and that the use of them can be understood 
as an instance of willful ignorance.
Recall that hermeneutical resources are structurally prejudiced if the ability to 
contribute to those resources of people in different social locations is asymmetrical, 
with the likely outcome that those resources differentially reflect the social 
experiences of the contributing groups. To the extent that the collective resources 
utilised in discussions of implicit bias are technical tools developed within academia 
(psychology, philosophy), the exclusion of Black and minority ethnicity individuals 
from academia is one way in which differently racialized groups are asymmetrically 
positioned to contribute to those resources. In the US, the National Centre for 
Education Statistics finds that, in 2018, 75% of full-time faculty were white, and 
amongst professors, 80% were white, with Black men and women comprising 4% of 
all professors. In the UK, a recent study indicates that ‘black academics constitute 
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1.54% of the total UK academic population a significant under-representation in 
terms of the broader resident black population being 3.3%’ (Shilliam, 2015: 32). At 
professorial level fewer than 1% are Black, 25 (raw figure) of whom are women 
(Rollock 2019). Insofar as psychology is not an outlier in terms of representation, the 
context in which the research on implicit bias is being done is one whereby the ability 
to contribute to those resources of Black and minority ethnicity individuals is 
asymmetric, simply insofar as there is drastic under-representation. This will be 
exacerbated in conditions, such as those reported on by Bhopal and Jackson (2013) in 
which black and minority ethnicity academics feel excluded, stereotyped and over-
scrutinised. And, as Romdenh-Romluc argues, there can remain hermeneutical 
marginalisation even when individuals  have access to hermeneutical power and are in 
positions to shape meanings - even  then, their hermeneutical marginalisation is likely 
to show up in the social meanings available for use (2016: 596).
Secondly, alongside the asymmetries in who contributes to the shared 
resources, we see differences in what kinds of evidence are afforded significance. To 
the extent that testimonies grounded in lived experience of racism are devalued, 
individuals offering such understanding for incorporation into the collective 
hermeneutical resources are thwarted in their attempts to do so. The case to be made 
here draws in part on the claims set out in our discussion of the vindication dynamic 
above. There, we drew upon Patricia Hill Collins’ claims that Black women’s 
knowledge has been marginalised, and in particular knowledge that is developed 
through and communicated in testimonies grounded in lived experiences of 
oppression is devalued. Already marginalised, these testimonies would be further 
disregarded if we were to focus solely on evidence pertaining to implicit bias. 
To a certain extent, this is a contingent matter: given limited air time or 
journal space, if that is given to quantitative psychological research on implicit bias 
rather than research that attends to lived experiences of racism, the latter are 
marginalised. However, this pattern is one that is entrenched in a set of epistemic 
dynamics that devalues the perspectives and experiences of people of colour, in 
particular women of colour. Indeed, Dotson draws on Audre Lorde to tease out 
different mechanisms through which Black women’s experiences (‘words, work and 
lives’) have been excluded: scrambling or distorting their words (e.g. by dissembling 
that one simply cannot understand what is being said); erasure; and disregard (2012: 
33). On the one hand, as mentioned above, psychological research on implicit bias 
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may in some sense serve to counteract the tendencies to scramble or erase experiences 
of racism – indeed, to focus on implicit bias is to point to evidence of its 
pervasiveness, and to affirm experiences of unintentional racism. However, to draw 
only on such evidence is nonetheless to disregard the contributions to addressing 
racism that have been made by those who have experienced and witnessed it, and to 
focus instead on the experimentally revealed dispositions of the perpetrators. This is 
to perpetuate a certain form of exclusion – both of certain knowers, and of a certain 
kind of knowledge – namely, that grounded in experiences of oppressive structure of 
the social world, and presented in the hermeneutical resources that capture those 
experiences.
So, the hermeneutical resources are structurally prejudiced in terms of who 
contributes to them; and this corresponds to the kinds of knowledge and 
understandings that are given prominence and marginalised, respectively, within those 
shared resources. In particular, testimony offers up a different aspect of the 
phenomena at issue: what it is lik  to experience persistent, everyday, racism. The 
resources needed to describe this aspect of the social world will of course be different 
from those required to describe the cognitive mechanisms that might underpin such 
patterns of discrimination. Our resources will be structurally prejudiced if the 
interpretative resources we have available to understand unintentional racism become 
dominated by, or excessively focused on, the cognitions of the perpetrators. As such, 
the shared or dominant resources may be asymmetrical in having rich resources to 
capture the phenomenon of perpetrating unintentional racism, but fewer resources – 
or a gap in the resources – to understand what it is like to experience such 
discrimination. This is to the disadvantage of anyone trying to register, in the shared 
collective resources, such experiences and the concepts needed to make good sense of 
them.
This exclusion thwarts the abilities of knowers to further contribute to the 
shared hermeneutical resources. One way these contributions are thwarted is simply 
the lack of uptake they receive. One cannot contribute to the shared hermeneutical 
resources if audiences do not hear or attend to the testimonies available. A second 
way in which such contributions are thwarted is a matter of emphasis: to the extent 
that evidence about experiences of discrimination is available, if it is not regarded as 
important or useful, it will be not be fully incorporated into the shared conceptual 
resources. The conceptual space for such meanings and understandings is there, but 
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relegated to an unimportant or peripheral aspect of the phenomenon that does not 
significantly advance collective understanding. A third way in which contributions 
may be thwarted is if the failure to get any uptake, or to be regarded as contributing 
valuable concepts for understanding the phenomenon, results in downstream 
‘testimonial smothering’ (Dotson 2011: 244). Testimonial smothering occurs when 
knowers fail to speak, in a particular context, having learned that they will not be 
heard. Whilst the harms of hermeneutical injustice and contributory injustice have 
already been articulated (see e.g. Fricker 2007, Dotson 2011), it is important in this 
context to emphasise that the collective resources of an epistemic community are 
overall weakened if the evidence from testimony about lived experiences of racism is 
not included – there are epistemic costs all round, in addition to the harm that accrues 
to individuals who are unable to contribute. We elaborate on this in the following 
section.
Finally, we contend that the use of these structurally prejudiced resources is 
(often) due to willful ignorance. Recall that on Dotson’s view, it is very easy to 
commit contributory injustice and very difficult to avoid it. Overlooking evidence that 
one really should be aware of can suffice to make this a case of willful ignorance. An 
overemphasis on the quantitative psychological literature on implicit bias, when one 
is aware of other sources of evidence, would constitute willful ignorance on this 
construal. 
Reflection on discourse about implicit bias, however, brings to light that there 
may be other ways of perpetrating contributory injustice that are not grounded in 
willful ignorance. For example, as mentioned above, there have been some gains from 
the attention to quantitative evidence of implicit bias, and one might make a strategic 
choice to focus on this evidence, rather than testimony, because, for example, one 
thinks there will be greater uptake amongst one’s peers of the psychological research 
program on implicit bias. There can be benefits to appearing to conform to oppressive 
epistemic norms of this type – norms such as ‘assign comparatively higher value to 
(quantitative) evidence generated by (white) academic experts’ – under specific, 
localised circumstances. For example, Michael Doan (2018) describes how activists 
and residents fighting for access to clean affordable water in Michigan (USA) 
benefited from conforming to epistemic norms giving preference to expert testimony 
from academic researchers. They (appeared to) conform to these norms by getting 
such experts engaged in their cause while also pushing back against the comparative 
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value judgement expressed in the norm, by highlighting the contribution that could be 
made by the stories of residents (cf. Medina 2013).
We do not wish to underplay the benefits of this type of strategic conformity 
to problematic norms but we do wish to highlight the associated risks. Whilst not 
setting aside testimony due to willful ignorance, this kind of strategic choice may still 
use and maintain structurally prejudiced hermeneutical resources that thwart others’ 
abilities to contribute to the shared epistemic resources, in the ways we described 
above - especially if it does not at the same time challenge the oppressive epistemic 
norms. That is, such a strategic choice in this context may still place focus on 
quantitative research about the cognitions of discriminators, at the cost of attention to 
testimony of those who have experienced discrimination. (Our claim is not that these 
strategic choices could never be justified; rather that they come with certain risks, 
consideration of which is needed in a full assessment of the strategic choice.) Thus we 
propose an expansion of the notion of contributory injustice, to extend not only to 
exclusions that result from willful ignorance, but also exclusions based in strategic 
choices. However, if one is concerned to preserve the notion of contributory injustice 
only for those cases grounded in willful ignorance, then it suffices for our purposes to 
claim that something very much like it – the use of structurally prejudiced 
hermeneutical resources that thwarts knowers’ abilities to contribute to shared 
epistemic resources, thus compromising their epistemic agency – can result from 
strategic choices, as well as from willful ignorance.
4. Inclusion, epistemic and practical gains
We are not arguing here that there is no place for discussion of the quantitative 
psychological research on implicit bias in discourse surrounding unintentional racism 
and institutional change. Rather, we are arguing for a proper integration of both kinds 
of evidence into the shared hermeneutical resources. Dotson argues that ‘addressing 
contributory injustice is difficult but not impossible. It requires … perceivers to be 
aware of a range of differing sets of hermeneutical resources in order to be capable of 
shifting resources appropriately’ (2012: 34). Dotson emphasises that this is by no 
means easy – that resources from marginalised groups might be difficult to access, 
difficult to navigate for those unfamiliar with the hermeneutical resources, and that 
considerable trust must be extended and developed by all sides in order to facilitate 
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‘transconceptual communication’. However, in this section we provide some tentative  
suggestions about how this integration might proceed. 
The move towards better integration of testimonial evidence of racism into 
discussions of unintentional racism will require challenging the oppressive epistemic 
norms identified in this paper, and which underpin the vindication dynamic and 
contributory injustice. This requires challenging norms that give greater evidential 
weight to quantitative data over qualitative testimonial reports - in particular the 
testimonial reports from members of hermeneutically marginalised groups – or norms 
that give greater weight to evidence about the cognitions of perpetrators over 
evidence about experiences of discrimination. We do not want to understate the extent 
to which there are likely to be difficulties here. For example, one will need to avoid 
the problems of epistemic exploitation (Berenstain 2016; Davis 2016) and epistemic 
appropriation (Davis 2018). One will also need to be attentive to matters of whose 
testimony is included; that false assumptions about how representative those 
experiences are, are not made; and that focusing on issues of ‘distribution of attention 
and conversational power’ do not obscure the importance of addressing systems of 
social power that marginalise (Táíwò, 2020).
We propose the following norms, as tentative starting points for the integrative 
project: first to address the hierarchies of evidence that Hill Collins articulates, we 
propose a norm of epistemic peership. Such a norm would reject the kinds of 
epistemic hierarchies we have encountered. As sources of evidence, quantitative and 
qualitative evidence have pro tanto equal probative value; academic scholarship about 
and lived experience of oppression each contribute distinctive evidential value. This is 
not to say that (e.g.) all testimony is as evidentially valuable as all academic 
scholarship; we well know that any instance of testimony can be unreliable, and any 
instance of putative scholarship can be junk. Rather, it is to say that there are multiple 
sources of evidence (not limited to those articulated above, though our norms at 
present range primarily over them), and their type per se does not determine their 
epistemic value. Second, to address the  problem of selective devaluation of some 
testimonies in particular, and as a corrective to the extant dynamics that we have 
pointed to in section 3, we adopt a norm of epistemic deference to the lived experience 
of marginalised groups. As Laurence Thomas puts it: ‘the idea that there should be a 
presumption in favour of the [oppressed] person’s account of [their] experiences’ 
(1992: 374). Enacting this norm requires attentiveness to the dangers that ‘deference 
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epistemology’, as Táíwò calls it, can present. It requires attention to the relative 
privileges and oppressions of marginalised group members, such that one does not 
attend to, and suppose as representative, the testimony of relatively privileged 
members of a marginalised group. It also requires ensuring that any such norm does 
not ‘provide cover for social abdication of responsibility’; that it does not reduce 
people to their experiences of trauma; and that focusing on attentional distribution 
does not distract from - but advances - attention to systemic social and material 
change (Táíwò, 2020). Finally, we propose a norm of reciprocal feedback. Part of 
recognising the values of the various sources of evidence is recognising the way that 
each can shape and advance the other. Qualitative testimonial evidence should shape 
and direct what quantitative data it might be important to gather; conversely, 
quantitative data may encourage new interpretations of personal experience. Neither 
academic scholarship in general, nor quantitative empirical research in particular, 
should be detached from lived experience (cf. Anderson 2007: 608-610). This is an 
inexhaustive list, but a start at the integrative project.
Earlier, we noted that the collective resources are weakened when testimonial 
evidence of racism is marginalised or excluded. What are the epistemic gains to be 
secured in avoiding the epistemic oppression we have described? The first gain is 
simply that of having more evidence about unintentional racism. One illustration of 
how this additional evidence can be useful is in being able to respond to scepticism 
that has emerged. Recently, many critiques have emerged of the research program on 
implicit bias (Oswald et al 2013, Singal 2017). And some take these concerns to 
undermine the motivation for institutional change.
Integrating testimonial evidence into our body of evidence about unintentional 
racism is important in helping us remain clear on the focus of this scepticism: what 
should not be cast in doubt is whether unintentional racism exists, whether individuals 
should be worried about their role in perpetrating it, and whether institutional change 
is needed in order to address problems of discrimination and exclusion. All this is 
affirmed by integrating testimonial evidence into our collective epistemic resources. 
Moreover, and crucially, the motivation for institutional change is not dependent on 
the robustness of the experimental findings – testimonial evidence provides us with 
reason to pursue changes to our policies and procedures that combat the forms of 
racism and exclusion that are described. Of course, sceptics about the implicit bias 
research program may also be sceptical about testimonial evidence of discrimination. 
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But as the evidence builds, from multiple different sources, the sceptic faces an 
additional burden of providing an alternative explanation for why so much evidence 
points towards what they seek to deny.
The second gain is that, precisely because it draws on the experiences of 
discrimination, testimonial evidence provides more evidence about the impact of 
unintentional racism. For example, one of the concerns arising from the testimonial 
evidence concerns the problem of deniability. Recall that unintentional racism may be 
likely to have a role where individuals (perpetrators) can rationalise their decisions 
and explain away a choice or action in terms that do not make reference to race. 
Testimonial evidence shows us how this can inflect the experience of discrimination: 
the problem of deniability gives rise to doubts about what has really occurred – was it 
racism, or a misstep, or perhaps I misheard…? Testimonies that elaborate on the 
problems of discriminators being able to rationalise away biased behaviour enrich the 
dominant hermeneutical resources by articulating the distinctive harm here: the 
cognitive and affective burdens of retaining confidence in one’s interpretation of 
one’s social interactions.
A third, practical, gain concerns how these hermeneutical resources enrich 
collective understandings of how to address problems of unintentional racism. One of 
the great frustrations with the quantitative research program on implicit bias is its 
failure to deliver robust and long-lasting interventions that change individual bias, or 
deliver changes in behaviour. Integrating testimonial evidence helps us to identify 
resources to draw on in taking steps to combat unintentional racism. Plenty of 
recommendations are already found in, and can be gleaned from, the testimonial 
evidence. For example, this evidence helps us to identify the importance of removing 
burdensome contestations, insofar as possible. Thinking about institutional policies or 
procedure from the point of view of addressing the problem of the contestability or 
deniability of what one has experienced, as well as from the perspective of reducing 
the incidence of bias, helps us see where efforts are most likely useful. Simply 
deploying strategies that aim to reduce bias (see Devine et al 2012) will do nothing to 
ensure, or provide assurance, that bias is not at work. It may even make it more 
difficult to challenge, since perpetrators can insist they have undertaken de-biasing 
strategies. In contrast, interventions that focus not on reducing individuals’ biases, but 
on changes to policy or procedure could do more to acknowledge the facts of 
systemic racism, provide mechanisms to challenge and address it, and set goals for 
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reshaping the institution. This might involve instating certain procedures or anti-racist 
policies, though that is not without potential pitfalls: a concern that came up in 
examining the experiences of Black and minority ethnicity academics was that 
procedures sometimes served as a smoke screen for continued discrimination 
(Pilkington 2013: 230).
We have proposed some norms for integrating qualitative testimonial evidence 
about lived experience with findings from the psychological research project on 
implicit bias. Our argument also highlights new questions to be addressed in future 
research. For example, how should we evaluate conflicting evidence about 
discrimination? Evidence from testimony may conflict with other testimony from 
people who are oppressed along the same, or different axes; or with evidence from 
other sources, such as evidence from the research programme in psychology, or 
statistical evidence about patterns of advantage or disadvantage (some of the 
difficulties of addressing these issues are articulated and evaluated by Kristie Dotson 
(2018)). Our work in this paper highlights the importance and value of finding ways 
to adjudicate these conflicts. 
5. Conclusion
In practical efforts to address the role of unintentional racism in sustaining racial 
injustices and exclusions, there are choices to be made in selecting evidence to 
support anti-racist efforts. Whilst evidence from research programs on implicit bias 
may secure important gains, focusing on this evidence alone, without also 
incorporating testimonial evidence, risks perpetuating the vindication dynamic, and 
perpetrating contributory injustice. Moreover, including this testimonial evidence can 
secure important epistemic gains, both motivating institutional change and enriching 
the resources available for understanding how to do this better.
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